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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EOSE GIBBONS, and 
AUSTIN K. TIEENAN, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
E. G. FEAZIEE, and 
UTAH COPPEE COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Eespondents. 
Respondents' Reply to Appellants' 
Application for Rehearing 
While avoiding a re-argument of this case, we will 
comment as briefly as possible upon appellants' appli-
cation for rehearing and their argument in support 
thereof. 
At the outset we are confronted with the state-
ment beginning at the bottom of page 3 of appellants' 
application and frequently renewed in varying form 
NO. 
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throughout the course of appellants' argument in sup-
port of that application, that this court saw fit to go 
outside the briefs of counsel and brief the case for it-
self, and that in reaching its conclusion did so without 
the aid of argument. In this we think counsel erred. 
Coupled with this statement counsel intimate that 
respondents' counsel have been unfair in attacking 
their proof of discovery and the existence of the other 
essentials of a valid location upon the occasion of the 
entry of the Valentine Script—they state they feel 
" abused" because (as we interpret their remark) we 
conceded the validity of the location upon the trial 
below. We so interpret their remark because other-
wise they would have no reason to feel abused. Such 
is the gravamen of this application for rehearing and 
the argument thereupon. 
This is the appellants' lawsuit—an action in eject-
ment brought by them, wherein to succeed they must 
establish in themselves the paramount title to the prem-
ises in question—that burden is theirs. I t was upon the 
trial below, upon the argument here and still is the 
theory of respondents that appellants can succeed in 
this suit only upon proof of legal title in themselves 
to the area in dispute, and that they cannot do because 
the government by its patent upon the Valentine Script 
had parted with its title to that area years before the 
entry or patent of the placer upon which appellants 
found their claim; that if appellants' suit in ejectment 
is to.be construed a.suit in equity to.set aside the pat-
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ent upon the Valentine Script, then respondents must 
be permitted the defense of laches. Neither the trial 
court nor this court have indicated any intention of so 
treating this suit in ejectment. Accordingly, upon the 
trial below, when appellants attempted to prove a 
valid discovery, respondents objected to appellants' 
effort as calling for matter "wholly irrelevant, in-
competent and immaterial to any issue in this case", 
(Tr. 59-60) and as a collateral attack upon the senior 
patent; that in this case the discovery on the placer 
claim was not in issue (Tr. 60); that for the purpose 
of this suit no legal title to the area in dispute could 
be predicated upon the placer patent until by an 
appropriate action in equity the senior patent upon 
the Valentine Script had been set aside; that appellants 
by their proof of such outstanding senior patent through 
which respondents deraign their title, had precluded 
any possibility of their success in the form of action 
they had chosen. Then counsel with alacrity chose to 
interpret respondents' objection as an admission of 
discovery, very properly testing this assumption, how-
ever, by the following: (Tr. 62-63) 
"Mr . McBroom: Just one point. Do you 
question the discovery at the time of the location 
of these deeds'? 
"Mr . Ellis: We take the record as it has 
been offered in evidence, that is all we know 
about it. 
(Argument and discussion.) 
3 
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" T h e Court : When the United States Gov-
ernment issues a mining patent, isn' t the mining 
patent enough? 
"Mr . McBroom: I think so, your Honor, 
but the question may arise. 
"Mr . Wallace: We will not go further, if 
your Honor please, to amplify this tender. I t 
may be necessary, if there is going to be any 
question about this thing, so that my record may 
be sufficient. 
" T h e Court: We have some legal questions 
to dispose of after a while, and I think you may 
introduce that proof of discovery, if you wish to. 
" M r . Parsons : Note an exception. 
" T h e Court: As I say, I don't see any 
reason why it should be done, or how it can 
affect the issues in this case, but there may be 
something in the record that you will want. 
"Mr . Wallace: If I didn't sincerely believe 
that it might arise, of course, I should not take 
the time of the court about this thing. 
"The Court: If you disagree with me, if 
you feel that it is necessary to prove that fact, 
and want to make your record with reference to 
the discovery, you may proceed to do that. I 
take it that the presumption is that there was a 
discovery, mineral discovery, and that the loca-
tion is properly made, and that presumption 
arises from the fact that the United States Gov-
ernment later issued a patent, a mining patent, 
on that ground. I take it that that is the position 
counsel takes for the reason of his objection. 
"Mr . Wallace: If counsel will take that 
position, your Honor, I would be through, but I 
4 
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would want him to take that concretely and 
specifically, but they say they will not. 
"Mr . Parsons: Counsels' position is that 
the McGruire & Company Placer is wholly apart 
from this investigation, and has no place in this 
case. 
"The Court: That raises the same question 
that we have argued already. 
"Mr . Parsons: I think so, your Honor. 
"The Court: And the court, while being 
inclined to agree with you, sustained the position 
of opposing counsel for the purpose of looking 
into the legal question later. The objection may 
be overruled, and you may now proceed. 
"Mr . Parsons: Exception." 
and then counsel proceeded to make their proof to 
which reference was made by our brief and upon which 
we predicated both written and oral argument in this 
court. 
It would indeed be a strange rule that if a de-
fendant during the trial, intent upon his conception of 
the issues and the law applicable thereto as he under-
stood it, made an objection in the course of the plain-
tiff's examination, which objection the court overruled 
that the plaintiff might make his case upon his own 
theory, that then the defendant would thereafter in 
argument be precluded from testing the plaintiff's 
case upon plaintiff's own theory so adopted. Nothing 
more than that has occurred here. Respondents did 
5 
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not concede a discovery and appellants know they did 
not (Tr. 63) : 
"Mr . Wallace: If counsel will take that pos-
ition, your Honor, I would be through, but I 
would want him to take that concretely and 
specifically, but they say they will no t . " 
The appellants were permitted to make their proof and 
presumably did their best. 
I t is equally strange that appellants now assert 
that this court came to its conclusion here without the 
aid of argument. In respondents' brief, beginning at 
page 22, will be found a discussion of the decision of 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Creed and 
Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. Uintah Tunnel 
Mining & Transportation Co., wherein respondents' 
counsel direct particular attention to the rule declared 
in that case to the effect that the mere issuance of 
patent " upon the McOuire & Company placer claim * * * 
raised no presumption of a discovery at any time prior 
to entry * * * nor any presumption of the staking of 
the claim on the ground, hence no presumption of a 
valid location prior to that date. Not only is there no 
presumption of a valid location upon the occasion of 
either entry or patent of the Valentine Script, but by 
all the authorities the issuance of the non-mineral pat-
ent was such an adjudication against the mineral 
character of the land and of its unoccupied and un-
appropriated condition as to be conclusive upon col-
lateral attack in an action at either law or equity. ' ' A 
6 
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further discussion of the decision of the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Uintah Tunnel Mining & 
Transportation Co. v. Creed, 119 Fed. 164, 57 C. C. A. 
200, with emphasis again directed to the same ques-
tion, will be found in respondents' brief beginning at 
page 38. Commencing at page 47 of respondents' brief 
is a discussion of what is necessary to a determination 
of the mineral or non-mineral character of land, and 
quoting from 18 E. C. L. § 122, at page 1222, will be 
found the statement that " land is not mineral unless 
it can be said that ' mineral can be obtained from it in 
such quantities and quality as to make it more valuable 
for mining than for agriculture' or uses other than 
mining", following which will be found at page 48, 
respondents' citation of Crissman v. Miller, and Steele 
v. Tannana Mines E. Co., in the discussion of what is 
necessary to a valid discovery, and at page 49, abstract 
of the testimony admitted below to prove that fact, 
which discussion is continued upon page 50 and con-
tains the statement that *i there was no testimony what-
ever as to the monumenting or marking of the claim 
on the ground * * * . " And therein, while reiterating 
our theory of the case and stating in our opinion that 
"appel lants ' theory *.* * confuses all distinctions be-
tween law and equitable actions and the relief and de-
fenses applicable thereto respectively", nevertheless 
that that par t of the Valentine Script in conflict with 
the placer claim appeared non-mineral and that neither 
monumenting nor discovery had been proved upon the 
7 
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placer claim, " a n d hence neither can be presumed upon 
the occasion of the Valentine Script en t ry ." And the 
appellants in their reply brief devote pages 8 to 14, 
both inclusive, to a discussion of this very question, 
saying that they felt abused and charging us with hav-
ing "changed theory on appeal ." And turning to 
appellants' assignments of error (Tr. 60) we find that 
while appellants asserted in their application for re-
hearing that no finding had been made upon which this 
court can predicate its decision, still appellants chose 
to treat Finding No. 2 (Tr. 12) as such a finding and 
assigned error in the making thereof because (Tr. 60) 
" the proof shows without contradiction that the Mc-
Guire & Company Placer Mining Claim was duly located 
prior to the entry of the west half of the east half of 
the northwest quarter of Section 26, and prior to the 
issuance of the agricultural patent to Bentley, and in 
consequence the mineral patent conveyed title by re-
lation to the date of discovery and location". Are we 
to be precluded from discussing that assignment merely 
because the taking of testimony upon the discovery and 
monumenting and other essentials to a valid location 
of the placer claim was over our objection and did not 
conform with our theory of the case! This court rested 
its decision largely upon Creed and Cripple Creek Min-
ing & Milling Co. v. Uintah Mining & Transportation 
Co., Crissman v. Miller and Steele v. Tannana Mines 
R. Co., all of them cited by respondents and given the 
same application they served in the opinion of this 
8 
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court. But in addition, there appears in the opinion 
of this court the following brief excerpt from the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of Montana in Hickey v. 
Anaconda C. M. Co., 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806: 
" I n our judgment, when a patentee seeks to 
show that his title is older than the evidence of 
his title indicates—when he seeks to show that, 
notwithstanding the date of his patent or re-
ceiver 's final receipt, his title in fact relates back 
to the date of his location, he must show affirm-
atively a location valid under the laws of the 
state where the claim is situated." 
Certainly no, court has ever taken exception to that 
portion of the decision in Hickey v. Anaconda C. M. 
Co. quoted above. That decision was followed upon 
that point by the Supreme Court of Arizona as late as 
September 14, 1922, in Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. 
United Eastern Mining Co., 24 Ariz. 269, 209 Pac. 283; 
(certiorari denied, 260 U. S. 744, 67 L. Ed. 492, 43 Sup. 
Ct, 165) at 292 the court said: 
i
' One who claims rights anterior to the entry 
of a mining claim for patent and dependent upon 
the order of the facts making up the right to 
the land is not concluded by the patent, but may 
show such order, including the fact of his own 
prior discovery of mineral. Cases supra, and 
Kahn v. Old Teleg. M. Co., 2 Utah, 174-188, 11 
Morrison's Mining Reports, 645; Last Chance 
Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 61 Fed. 557, 566, 
9 C. C. A. 613; Hickey v. Anaconda C. M. Co., 
33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806; Butte & S. Co. v. 
Clark Mont. Realty Co., 249 U. S. 12, 39 Sup. 
9 
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Ct. 231, 63 L. Ed. 447; Lindley on Mines (3d 
Ed.) § 783." 
That is hornbook learning. The decision stressed by 
counsel of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in Butte & Superior Copper Co. 
v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 248 Fed. 609, in no man-
ner questions the propriety of that statement, and the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the same case to be found in 249 U. S. 12, 63 L. Ed. 
447, contains the following reference to the rule made 
in the manner of one stating a legal maxim: 
' ' Priority of right is not determined by 
dates of entries or patents of the respective 
claims, but by priority of discovery and location, 
which may be shown by testimony other than the 
entry and patent ." 
By the statutes of Montana a declaratory statement was 
required to be recorded twenty days after discovery 
and in the Hickey case it was held the statement record-
ed did not conform with the statute; that the statement 
in the prescribed form was necessary to a valid loca-
tion; that by reason of this failure the location was 
invalid; that the patent title could not relate back to an 
invalid location so as to defeat intervening adverse 
rights. This was a logical application of the rule we 
are discussing and the federal court took no exception 
to the rule, but, influenced by the passage of a statute 
expressly saving the validity of locations wherein the 
declaratory statement was defective, held merely that 
10 
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the declaratory statement was not essential to a valid 
location and the location in that case being valid, the 
patent title would relate back to the date of such per-
fected location. We are not here interested in the 
declaratory statement requirement of the Montana 
statutes, and the Hickey case and that portion of the 
decision therein quoted by this court, correctly states 
tJie rule relative to the establishment of priority when 
claimed to antedate final entry, following therein 
Creed and Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. 
Uintah Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co., and the 
host of other decisions to the same effect. Patent 
titles of course relate to the valid locations. Kahn v. 
The Old Telegraph Mining Company,2 Utah 174. Pat-
ent titles do not relate to invalid locations. Patent 
titles do not by relation cut off rights that intervene 
before such locations became valid or were perfected, 
and hence the necessity where the proponent relies 
upon a title antedating final entry, he must prove a 
valid location and the date when the same became per-
fected and valid, to which discovery and monumenting 
upon the ground are unavoidable essentials. I t is said 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Creed 
and Cripple Creek M. & M. Co. v. Uintah Tunnel Mines 
& Transportation Co. that " the plaintiff's right does 
not antedate his discovery; at least it does not prevail 
over any then existing r ights ." What the relation may 
be in the absence of intervening rights is a matter with-
out interest to us here. In the present casQ rights have 
11 
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intervened, rights of a dignity no less than those of a 
United States patent. And to defeat the presumption 
arising thereupon the burden was upon the appellants, 
on their own theory of the case, to prove when their 
location was perfected and became a valid location. 
We make this statement by way of argument upon 
appellants' theory, although still insisting that such an 
inquiry would be appropriate only in an equitable ac-
tion to set aside respondents' senior patent. Brock-
bank v. Albion Mining Co., 29 Utah 367, 81 Pac. 863. 
The Creed case is sufficient authority and was so re-
garded by this court, and in view of the consideration 
given by this court to and its decision upon this ques-
tion, there appears no necessity for an additional 
argument thereof now. 
Nor is it immaterial when the claim was marked 
on the ground. Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed. : 
•"§ 339. Discovery is but one step in acquir-
ing title to a mining claim. It must be followed 
by location." 
"§ 371. The Bevised Statutes of the United 
States contain the mandatory provision, that the 
* location must be distinctly marked on the 
ground so that its boundaries can be readily 
traced.' There is no escape from this require-
ment. * * * The requirement is an imperative 
and indispensable condition precedent to a valid 
location, and is not to be 'frittered away by con-
struction.' After the discovery, it is the main 
act of original location." 
12 
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In Brockbank v. Albion Mining Co., 29 Utah 367, 
81 Pac. 863, this court held tha t : 
" * * * where a discovery of mineral 
has been made, and a proper location notice 
filed, then, if the boundaries are marked on the 
ground, before intervening rights have accrued, 
the claim will be valid. The locator, however, 
delays at his peril, since thereby he assumes the 
risk of intervening rights of third parties. # * * " 
The mineral character of the land in a contest be-
tween a mineral and a non-mineral entryman is not to 
be settled in favor of the mineral entry merely by the 
finding of color, even though such discovery may afford 
sufficient encouragement to miners to continue their 
exploration in the hope of finding gold in paying quan-
tities. (Steele v. Tannana Mines E. Co., discussed at 
pages 48 and 49 of respondents' brief and cited and 
relied upon by this court in its decision in this case). 
As pointed out in respondents' brief—"In a contest be-
tween mineral and non-mineral claimants it is in-
cumbent upon the former to show as a present fact that 
the character of the land is such that mineral can be 
obtained from it in such quantity and quality as to 
make it more valuable for mining than for agriculture. 
* * * When the controversy is between two mineral 
claimants the rule respecting the sufficiency of mineral 
is more liberal than when it is between a mineral claim-
ant and one seeking to make an agricultural entry, for, 
by the very nature of the controversy between mineral 
claimants, it is tacitly assumed that the land is min-
13 
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eral." (§ 122, 18 E. C. L., page 1222, cited at pages 
30 and 31 of respondents' brief.) 
By the non-mineral patent upon the Valentine 
Script (the senior patent) we have an adjudication by 
the Land Department that the land so patented was 
non-mineral in character. Appellants' testimony must 
be weighed in relation to their burden, if this action is 
to take on the character of one in equity and appellants 
be afforded herein an opportunity upon equitable prin-
ciples to set aside the non-mineral patent. So measur-
ed, their effort must fail as decided by this court. It 
is fairly apparent from the testimony, we think, that 
the only value this placer claim now has or ever had 
was for residence, to which use it has been put. As 
testified by the appellants' witness Michael Gibbons 
(Ab. 51) " I t is pretty well roofed over, yes." There 
is no testimony from which one could conclude this 
adjudication, accomplished by the non-mineral patent, 
was in error. 
Counsel expect much from the doctrine of relation, 
not merely that the patent title relates to the perfected 
valid location, but that a location once initiated may 
be perfected at any time and thereafter should patent 
issue, such patent title would relate to the time of the 
initial step, whether or not rights have intervened be-
fore such location attained any validity. A mere 
statement of their contention condemns it. Appellants 
can find no authority upon which to predicate it. 
14 
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CONCLUSION. 
This court has considered and correctly decided 
sufficient of the questions involved in the case as to 
have conclusively disposed of the controversy. It has 
neither misconceived nor overlooked any material fact 
or facts that could affect the result it has attained by 
its decision, and it has based its decision on no wrong 
principle of law. Indeed, this court has founded its 
decision upon principles so elementary and universally 
accepted as to forbid a doubt as to the soundness there-
of. Appellants' application for rehearing should be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, PARSONS & ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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